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assistance is absolutely indispensable to us. Well, we are induced by these arguments to engage the services of this infallible guide, and then we are told that it is not necessary for us to know these difficult doctrines at all, and that it is enough if we are persuaded of the trustworthiness of our guide.

Why, the story with which we commenced hardly fully represents the state of the case. In that story our guide took our money, and then left us to find the way for ourselves. In this case the guide says that all we have to do is to pay him his fee, take him for our guide, and be fully persuaded of his efficiency, but that our making the journey is wholly unnecessary, or, at least, if we do make the journey, it is not that we have a guide to tell us at each moment of doubt what path to choose and what turn to take, but that we are to put ourselves into a close carriage, and be carried along with the windows shut, persuaded that we are going right, but without the least knowledge where or how we have been driven.

It is worth remarking also that the "four great truths of faith, which nobody can go to Heaven without knowing," are every one of them taught as distinctly by the Church of England as by the Church of Rome. These truths are contained in the answers to the following questions:—

- "1. How many Gods are there? *One God.*
- "2. How many Persons are there in one God? *Three Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.*
- "3. Which of them took a body and soul, and died on the Cross for our sins? *God the Son, Jesus Christ, took body and soul, and died on the Cross for our sins.*
- "4. What will God do to the good? *He will make them happy for ever in Heaven.* And what to the wicked? *He will burn them for ever in Hell.*"

All these doctrines are taught just as plainly by the Church of England as by the Church of Rome; and if, then, a member of the Church of England be enticed by the promise of an infallible guide in his perplexity to join the Romish communion, he finds that his guide's directions with regard to the necessary points of faith come just to this—go on believing as you believed already. This is much the same as our Swiss guide's direction—follow on the path-right before you.

Again, we have to remark that in this attempt to enumerate the truths which every Christian must know, the advocates of Romanism adopt the very same principle which they assail when put forward by Protestants. When it is objected to Protestants that there are difficulties in the Bible, they answer that these difficulties do not obscure those points that are necessary to salvation, and that the great highway to salvation is plain, and broad, and easily found, although there may be difficulty and perplexity in tracing out some of those bye-paths that our curiosity leads us to wish to explore. Roman Catholic controversialists, on the other hand, have denied that there is any such distinction of fundamental and non-fundamental truths. They say it is our duty to believe *everything* that God has revealed; and that, whether the matter be great or small, the sin of rejecting a revelation from God is in all cases the same. And, certainly, if any man *knows* any doctrine to be revealed by God, and yet refuses to believe it, his sin is great, whether the place that doctrine holds in the economy of grace be high or low. But it is not very likely that any one can believe God to be incapable of falsehood or deceit, and yet refuse to believe a revelation which he knows to come from God. We may take for granted that men in general will believe what they know to be revealed from God, and the only question is, what are they bound to *know* and to believe explicitly? When Roman Catholics come to explain themselves, they are forced to confess that they cannot assert it to be necessary to salvation that every man shall believe explicitly *everything* that can be deduced from Scripture. On the other hand, we see that some doctrines are taught there so plainly that the denial of them by an individual of ordinary knowledge and capacity will argue some culpable carelessness or prejudice on his part. Protestants think that they are safe in assuming that whatever God has made absolutely necessary for the salvation of men in general He has revealed with sufficient clearness to be understood by men in general; and they see that some things are so plainly revealed that no unprejudiced man of common understanding can miss seeing them. These are what they mean by fundamental truths, and their belief that there are such truths must be shared by any one who attempts, as Father Furniss does, to make an enumeration of truths that every Christian must know.

Now that we have shown how much of Protestant principle there is in the very conception of Mr. Furniss's attempt, it will appear what injustice and untruth there is in Dr. Milner's assertion that it is impossible for Protestants to make an act of faith. We copy the following "Act of Faith" from the first edition of Mr. Furniss's book. We do not know why it is left out in the second, seeing that one may gain by saying it an indulgence of seven years and seven times forty days, which may be given to the souls in Purgatory:—

"O my God, because what you say is most true, and you have said it, I believe that you are one God in three Persons—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. I believe that God the Son, Jesus Christ, took a body and soul, and died on the Cross for our sins. I believe that you will make the good happy for ever in Heaven, and burn the wicked for ever in Hell. I believe all that the

Catholic Church teaches, and in this belief, with God's help, I will live and die."

Thus it will be seen that the act of faith consists of a profession of *explicit* belief in the "four great truths of faith," and of *implicit* belief in all the Church teaches. But substitute the one word Bible for Church, and the Protestant will make the same confession with all his heart. He will profess his explicit belief in the same four great truths of faith, and his implicit belief in all the Bible teaches.

This being the case, we ask Roman Catholics to judge whether the condition of Protestants is so unsafe as they are apt to imagine, and whether the necessity of an infallible guide is as great as has been pretended? In fact, it is evident that an infallible guide is necessary only as far as *explicit* knowledge is necessary. If our readiness to receive all that God has revealed *without knowing* it is enough for our salvation, then there is an end at once to the pretence that it was necessary for the salvation of the world that God should provide them with an infallible guide to make them know the truth. Why may not Protestants be saved by their implicit faith in the Bible as well as Roman Catholics by their implicit faith in the Church? Take the case of a Roman Catholic earnestly desirous not to contradict anything that his Church teaches, though he has not taken the trouble to form any opinion at all upon a number of points on which she declares that error is damnable, and although there may be some points on which he is wrongly informed as to her teaching. In such a case, it is held that his false belief will not injure one who did not wilfully reject anything that he knew the Church to have taught. And why may not a Protestant be saved in like manner who is sincerely and earnestly desirous to believe everything that God has revealed in the Scriptures, and who has learned from the Scriptures the "four great truths of faith," and many other of those truths that make wise unto salvation, even though there may be some points on which he has wrongly interpreted the teaching of the Scriptures? Have we not as good a right in this case as in the other to say that his false belief will not be fatal to one who is, notwithstanding, of an humble, teachable disposition, and who does not wilfully reject anything that he knows God to have revealed?

What Roman Catholics ask us to believe is, that implicit faith in the Church is sufficient to save us, but that implicit faith in God is not. In other words, we are not safe if we build our house on the Rock, and we are safe if we build it on the sand. Roman Catholics who acknowledge the Bible to be a revelation from God must own that Protestants are on firm ground, when they place their full belief in everything that God has revealed through the Scriptures. But can they say that they are on equally firm ground when they teach for doctrines the commandments of men? We ask those Roman Catholics who believe it to be wholly impossible that their Church and their priests can ever lead them astray to consider well what we have to say in our next article.

WHAT EVERY CHRISTIAN MUST DO.

It is exactly a year since, in our number for March 1856, our attention was first called by a correspondent, who signed himself "Enoch Heli," to the little book circulated by the Redemptorist Fathers, and which then bore the title "What every Christian must know." The book must have had a large sale, since Protestants and Roman Catholics, each for their own reasons, have vied with each other in circulating it; and, on its coming to a new edition, the author perceiving that it was much more of a guide to practice than to faith, changed the title to "What every Christian must know and do." We have thought it advisable to discuss the two subjects in separate articles; and having made some remarks on Father Furniss's attempt to enumerate the things which every Christian must know, we proceed now to examine his account of "What every Christian must do."

But those who have read our article on this book in our January number will be disposed to think that the title ought to have been, not "What every Christian must do," but, "What every Christian may do." Rules of conduct which sound very well are accompanied by exceptions or limitations, affording much convenient license to any persons in want of a flexible code of morality. Thus, we must not strike our parents, or put out our tongue at them, or mock them—in their presence; we must not curse them, or call them such very bad names as fools, or beasts, or drunkards—in their hearing. We must not break an oath; but it is not an oath, if when we said the words, we did not mean to take an oath. We must not do any servile work on the Lord's Day; but it is not servile work to write, or teach, or draw, and to be paid for doing it. Nor is it a mortal sin to do servile work without necessity for less than two hours, or two hours and a-half. We must not do any great bodily injury to others; but it is not a sin to desire some temporal misfortune to another, in order that it may make him cease to give scandal, or be converted, or not persecute the good. Tailors must not cabbage any of the cloth entrusted to them,

a Father Furniss appears to be very much of the opinion of the Abbot of Wignone, who maintained that the Christian religion only obliged him to love his enemies' souls; but that he did not feel himself in any way bound to love their bodies. (See *Friedrich's Researches in the Record Office*, Fraser's Magazine, Feb., 1857.)

unless there is a common custom of doing it, or unless it be necessary in order to gain a reasonable profit. Neither must shopkeepers adulterate what they sell, by mixing water, for instance, with any liquor, unless there is a common custom of doing it, or unless it be necessary in order to gain a reasonable profit.

These are only some specimens of Father Furniss's opinions as to what a Christian may do; and if our only object were to amuse our readers with these exhibitions of eccentric morality, we should go on to give them some specimens of his notions as to some of the things which a Christian may not do; but we feel that we have said enough for our purpose. We shall not insult our readers by discussing the question whether the code of morality here taught is one fit to be put forward by Christian teachers. We can imagine excuses made for some few of these points of moral teaching, or can conceive attempts made to show that they are capable of a good sense; but every one whose own moral feelings are not completely blunted, must allow that this teaching, when understood in its most obvious sense, is bad teaching; and that if the poor people, among whom it is circulated at the price of one halfpenny, follow its advice in the sense which they are sure to put upon it, it is calculated to produce, or to perpetuate, among them a very low standard of morals.

Therefore, without wasting more words on the question whether the morality of this tract is pure and Christian morality, we pass at once to the question—is it the moral teaching of the Church of Rome? If Father Furniss alone were responsible for the doctrines of his book, we should not waste powder and shot upon him. We do not wish to make a Church responsible for the faults of an individual; nor should we blame the Roman Catholic Church because one of her priests has published a book of lax morality, unless it can be made to appear that that morality is the morality of his Church.

Father Furniss distinctly puts forward that he is not the author of his code of morality, which he professes to have only compiled from the works of St. Alphonsus Liguori; and we can bear testimony that the defence is a just one; that Father Furniss has said nothing for which he cannot produce the authority of this canonized saint; but, on the other hand, that if he had not omitted or softened many things which are to be found in Liguori, he would have made his work still more unfit for general circulation than it is.

We had ourselves made the morality of St. Liguori the subject of several articles in this periodical (see our numbers from May to September, 1855), and had endeavoured to persuade our Roman Catholic friends to ask themselves how it came to pass that the morality taught by St. Liguori, who can claim to be the most trustworthy and authoritative exponent of Roman Catholic teaching on this subject, should be so far below the morality taught and practised by heretic English gentlemen. The line of argument adopted by Roman Catholic defenders of Liguori was, that we were casting in their teeth musty Latin volumes which were not in the hands of the people, and of which not one Roman Catholic in fifty knew anything. In an article in the *Dublin Review* (Oct., 1851), apparently written by Cardinal Wiseman, this defence is made:—

"The work of the saint, from its nature, is one which is little likely to fall into the hands of ordinary readers, and still less likely to be understood by them. Even the Catholic laity, to say nothing of the Protestant, have no access to the work of St. Alphonsus, for they are far too well instructed in their duty to exercise an idle, and it may even be a vicious, curiosity upon a subject with which, as a body, they have no concern."

At that time we thought it enough to reply, that though the Roman Catholic might have no direct knowledge with St. Liguori's work, still they could not help becoming very well acquainted with it indirectly. St. Liguori is the most approved guide for Roman Catholic confessors, and if the Saint has, in any one case, pronounced that to be innocent which Gospel morality condemns, the error does not remain a speculative one, but leads to practical consequences. "In thousands of confessional the uneasy scruples of penitents are lulled to rest with the assurance that the act which has caused them remorse has been pronounced on sufficient authority to be no sin at all. The penitents, with disordered consciences, go their way; they have no fear of committing the same act again themselves, and if they are tolerably good natured, will take care, too, to enlighten any of their friends who may not be so well informed as themselves. And so the whole public opinion of Roman Catholic countries is infected, and the morality of Liguori supplants the morality of the Gospel."

This was the account which we gave of the way in which the moral teaching of Liguori might become familiar to thousands who had never seen in print a line professing to be taken from his works. But now there is an end to all dispute. When abridgments of Liguori's moral teaching are circulated by thousands among the people, and with the highest sanction of the heads of the Roman Catholic Church in this country, it can no longer be considered a mere speculative question whether his morality be sound or not.

It is worth while to notice another distinction by which the writer of the article in the *Dublin Review*, already referred to, endeavoured to defend the laxity of

some of the decisions in St. Liguori's Moral Theology. There are two classes of writings on morals by Roman Catholic divines—works on ascetic theology, and on moral theology, the latter being intended as a guide for confessors, the former for the general instruction of the people. The works on moral theology, it is admitted, are often lax enough, the great object being, confessedly, "to find excuses for sinners." The confessor is anxious to relieve the penitent who comes to him *after the sin has been committed* from too overwhelming a remorse; he is desirous to take into account whatever extenuating circumstances there may be in the details of the offence: the very fact of the sinner having come to confession gives him a claim for indulgence; and so the general character of works intended for the guidance of confessors is often such as to leave, on a hasty reader, impressions at variance with the strictness of Catholic morality. But it is said that very different language is used in works on ascetic theology, which are intended for the guidance and "direction" of the Christian; and the same priest would earnestly warn against committing an act a person who should come to him *beforehand* for direction, who, if he were consulted by the same person as a penitent *after the act* was committed, would be anxious to reduce it to a venial sin, or to make out, if possible, that it was no sin at all. And the *Dublin Review* accuses of a gross blunder, not to say of culpable carelessness or dishonesty, those Protestants who have treated Liguori's Moral Theology as if it could ever be used by Roman Catholics in the way of "direction."

In our article in the year 1855, we took some pains to show that the defence here set up for the laxity of Liguori's Moral Theology was not a sound one. And without going over the same ground now, we may remark that there might be some justification for this different character of the advice to be given to a man *after* committing a sin and *before* it, if one who committed a sin once was in no danger of ever doing the like again. But as things are, it is evident that the advice given a penitent *after* one commission of a sin, is *before* his next commission of it. And if the confessor, after the event, exercise his Moral Theology in finding excuses for the sinner, and satisfying him that the act was only a venial sin, or no sin at all, he will find it hard to inculcate the lessons of his "ascetic theology," and to make the penitent believe that the same act will be mortal sin the next time he commits it. But whatever may have been the value of the *Dublin Reviewer's* defence of Liguori's Moral Theology, it does not apply to the present case. Father Furniss's tract is a work on ascetic theology, little as our readers might suppose so. It is not intended for the consolation of those who *have* fallen into sin, but for the counsel and guidance of those who desire to know how they may avoid falling into sin. It is the department of moral teaching in which the Church of Rome promises to give a specimen of her greatest strictness. The *Dublin Reviewer* while he warns us that we are not to look for severe decisions in the department of Moral Theology, takes credit for all the strictness that can be desired in this department of teaching. The Church, he says, must take the world as it is, and not as she would wish it to be, and, therefore, while she *teaches* according to the strictest standard, she *decides* according to the most equitable one. If, then, her *teaching* fall below the standard of even heathen morality, can the Church of Rome venture to claim to be the infallible interpreter of the doctrine of Christ.

But it may be asked (and a correspondent has asked),^a why make the Church of Rome responsible for Father Furniss's publication? Do we make the Church of England responsible for every unwise publication that proceeds from the pen of one of her priests or even of one of her bishops?

There is this great difference, that the Church of Rome claims to be an infallible guide to her members, and insists on the necessity of their learning their religion not from books, but from a living, speaking guide, always at hand and ready to be consulted. A Roman Catholic layman cannot go to decrees of councils to learn the doctrines of his Church, he must go for them to his priest; and this is the very way in which Roman Catholic divines maintain that he may learn them with infallible certainty. "Most likely," says Dr. Milner, "the Catholic peasant learns the doctrine of the Church from his parish priest, but then he knows that the doctrine of this priest must be conformable to that of his bishop, and that otherwise he will soon be called to account for it. He knows also that the doctrine of the bishop himself must be conformable to that of the other bishops and the Pope; and that it is a fundamental maxim with them all never to admit of any tenet but such as is believed by all the bishops, and was believed by their predecessors up to the Apostles themselves." Thus we see that the way in which the Church of Rome carries out her claim to be a living, speaking, infallible guide, is by giving a power of attorney to her priests to speak for her, and she must accordingly be held responsible for the teaching which they actually put forth. Now, in Father Furniss's case, it is not a mere presumption that the doctrine of the priest is in conformity with the doctrine of the bishop, for his work bears the imprimatur of Dr. Paul Cullen,

the authorized representative of the Pope and virtual head of the Roman Catholic Church in this country; and it is not a mere presumption that the doctrine of the bishop is in conformity with that of other bishops and of the Pope; for the writer Alphonsus Liguori, from whom the teaching of the work in question has been borrowed, has been canonized as a saint by the same Pope, the sacred congregation of rites having decreed unanimously that in all his works examined according to the discipline of the Apostolic See there was nothing worthy of censure.

We feel confident, then, that we have brought home this book to the Church of Rome. This is her teaching, and the only question is, is it good teaching? Remember that the Church of Rome demands that we should absolutely submit our private judgment to her, on the ground that she is infallible, and can never err. If, then, a single instance can be brought forward in which it can be proved that she *has* erred, her whole claim falls to the ground, and she is a convicted impostor. She is proved to have demanded the obedience of Christian people on false pretences, and to have promised them an immunity from error, which she is not able to realize. In the words of the motto of a Roman Catholic book, which has lately been advertised in the newspapers, "*the Church which can be convicted of one single error cannot be the pillar and ground of the truth.*" In points of speculative doctrine it may not be always easy to convince one brought up from childhood to believe in the infallibility of his Church, that she has actually erred, even in the case of the very newest of her doctrines, and that least supported by tradition, such for instance as the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. Protestants, indeed, are amazed at the boldness of making an assertion respecting an event which happened nearly two thousand years ago, in the absence of the testimony of any one who lived within a thousand years of the time; and, notwithstanding that Roman Catholic divines held, not fifty years ago, that the Church had no tradition on the subject. (See Milner's *End of Controversy*.) Still Roman Catholics are trained to take the assertion of their Church in lieu of all other evidence, and are contented with the impossibility of any one proving a negative on the subject. But when the question is one not of speculation but of practice, when an attempt is made to tamper with the immutable laws of morality, we know that honest and upright Roman Catholics have a voice within their hearts which tells them, if they will listen to it, this doctrine is not true.

Let priests and bishops and pope join together to tell us not to curse our parents in *their presence*, or call them bad names in *their hearing*, let them assure us that the ordinary obligations to honesty may give way if there is a "common custom" to the contrary, or if they stand in the way of our gaining a "reasonable profit," and still we hope that there are many of our Roman Catholic brethren who would tell priest and bishop and pope, "we know that this teaching is false." And when the bishops and pope go on to say that it is a fundamental maxim with them never to admit of any tenet but such as was believed by their predecessors up to the Apostles themselves, does not the falsehood of the assertion become so glaring as to excite a smile. The Apostles the authors of teaching such as this! Who could be persuaded that anyone ever learned from the Apostles rules to enable a child to curse his parents innocently by going out of their hearing, or to enable a shopkeeper to cheat his customers without sin, when his profits are too small, or when others set him the example!

Perhaps, however, some Roman Catholic priest will say, "We do not pretend that we learned these lessons from the Apostles. We only claim to have been taught by them in matters of faith, and we pretend to no infallibility on matters affecting practice. We maintain that God has interfered by special miracles to guard our speculative belief from the least admixture of error, but in all questions of morals we are left to the uncertainties of private judgment." The statement of this theory is a sufficient refutation of it. As if Christianity were only intended to gratify curiosity, only meant to make us wiser, and not to make us better, and as if sanctity of life were not as much the great object of its founder as purity of faith. Are we to believe that God interferes by miraculous gifts to secure the latter, while he is indifferent about the former? Roman Catholics certainly regard the smallest error in an article of faith as of infinitely more dangerous consequences than the grossest violation of Christian duty. A Roman Catholic will regard the most virtuous of Protestants as having less hope in his death than the most abandoned profligate who has always held the right faith. Nay, it matters not whether he has had a correct knowledge of the right faith, provided that he has lived in the communion of the right Church, and not wilfully contradicted her tenets. The Church of Rome has methods to make the death-bed comfortable of one who has lived his whole lifetime through in ignorance of the doctrines of the Gospel, and in violation of its precepts. Implicit faith will supply the defects of his belief, and a relaxed morality will find excuses for the obligations of his practice.

Roman Catholics, we call on you to judge whether the teachers of such doctrines as these are the followers of the Apostles.

They made no attempt to accommodate the strictness of Gospel morality to the practices of the world; nor would they accept outward submission to their authority as any substitute for the purity of Christian faith and practice. With these modern teachers, on the contrary, to be included in the outward communion of their Church is everything; and since they cannot make the world "such as they would wish it to be" they confessedly lower their standard of morality to that which will be acceptable to the world as it is. Do not these modern teachers show their object to be, not to build up living members of the body of Christ, walking in true holiness before Him, but to gain on any terms proselytes and adherents to themselves. And may we not conclude with certainty that they are not the followers of the Apostles who "preached not themselves, but Christ Jesus our Lord."

INVOCATION OF SAINTS.

(Continued from page 4.)

WE have hitherto viewed the invocation of saints in the light in which Roman Catholics wish it to appear, and which they deem most advantageous to their cause; and we have seen, that even thus viewed that practice is without any, the slightest foundation in God's word, and, in point of fact, an useless, dangerous, and unchristian invention. But we must go beyond this; for, while Romanists say they merely solicit the prayers of the saints, they do not fairly represent the teaching and authorized practices of their Church. Whatever they may say to the contrary, the fact is, that they do worship the saints, and do regard them as more than mere intercessors. They regard the saints as more than mere intercessors, since they rely on their merits to obtain the divine favour. In the Canon of the Mass, after enumerating several saints, the officiating priest prays—"By whose (the saints) merits and prayers thou wouldst grant that we may be fortified by the help of thy protection, through the same Jesus Christ, Amen." Here, God's blessing is sought for the sake of the merits of the saints, which is making them mediators of atonement. We might furnish a large number of examples of other prayers in which the merits of the saints are alleged as a ground of confidence in approaching God. Any one may find abundance of them in the Roman Missal, and in other Romish devotional books. Romanists, also, in invoking the prayers of the saints, and supposing that they can hear and know concerning their various petitions, necessarily admit them to be omniscient.^b If they be not omniscient, they cannot know concerning all the persons soliciting their aid in all parts of the world, at the same time, with untold purposes and motives. If there be one thing that a saint does not know, that one thing may be the prayer of some poor Romanist; and the only security that any one can have that a saint knows anything of his petition to him, is that the said saint knows everything. The same may be said of angels. Now, this matter has sorely puzzled Roman Catholic divines. St. Isidore, of Seville, who, by the way, cannot be called a Roman Catholic in the full sense of the term, says, "The angels understood all things in the word of God before they came to pass, and those things which to men are yet future they know at present, by the revelation of God."^c In another part of his works, describing the blessed, he quotes that passage—"they are as the angels which are in heaven."^d Peter Lombard maintains the affirmative of the proposition, "that what is said concerning the angels relates also to the souls of the saints."^e The consequence of all this is, that saints and angels are omniscient; that is, possessed of one of the peculiar attributes of Deity. But to suppose them omniscient is to set them up as God, and is plainly idolatrous. To avoid this idolatrous consequence, which is fairly the result of Roman Catholic teachings, and the plainly expressed opinions of St. Isidore, the schoolmen, and the Roman doctors in general, resort to the notion that the saints behold in the word of God (i.e., Christ), as in a mirror, the petitions that are offered to them on earth, and whether they may be granted or not. The whim is apparently founded on a passage in St. Augustine, which has been dragged forward on all occasions by Roman Catholic divines, though that Father's meaning was quite different from theirs. Referring to this, Peter Lombard says, "For as to the angels, so also to the saints, who assist God, our petitions are made known in the Word of God, which they contemplate. Whence, also, they are said to offer to God our prayers and vows, not because they would teach God, but because they consult his will with respect to those things."^f But this does not remove the difficulty; it makes it greater—at the same time that it is itself only a fanciful conjecture. If the saints know things in the divine Word, they know all things; or if they do not know all things, that of which they are ignorant may, for aught any one knows, be the very prayer which he is pouring forth to them.

But Romanists not only call upon the saints to pray

^a "Ordo Missae."

^b We only use the word "omniscient" here for want of a more suitable one, with reference to what is passing in our own world, and not with reference to the whole universe. See our last January number, p. 11.

^c S. Isidori, Sententiar, lib. I., cap. x. 17, tom. vi., p. 137. Roma, 1802

^d Mark xii., 25.

^e Petri Lombardi Sententiar, lib. iv., Dist. xlv. Paris, 1545, p. 389.

^f Augustinus De Civ. Dei, lib. xi., cap. xxix., tom. vii., p. 295, Ben Ed.

^g Petri Lombardi Sententiar, lib. iv., Dist. xlv., p. 388 b.